Some Esential Points in Reading The Critique of Pure Reason :: Modern Philosophy Research Papers

Some Esential Points in Reading The Critique of Pure ReasonABSTRACT (1) Things are non to be found in the Critique (real things also called physical objects-an date avant la lettre as in Husserl). The things as appearances are only Vorstellungen (representatio, B376). wonder arrives because Kant calls these objects with the equivalent names employed in the expression of common hotshot for designating the things. (2) Due to the absence of these things, nothing is said concerning the similarity between things and falsifiable objects (things as appearances, Erscheinungen). (3) Things in themselves, considered in the abstraction of sensible receptivity, are for this truly abstraction, unknowable. Consequently, they cannot be considered as the origin of appearances. (4) I propose an explanation of the relation mentioned in (2). (5) What is the use of the Critique of so strange a conceit as the thing in itself instead of alone mentioning real things and their representations in the subject? (6) Mind is not an adequate translation of the German gemstonet. I think subject is better. At this paper I shall square up myself to expose only two items as possible themes of an adequate practice of the Critique. (1a) According to the imposed extension of the paper a detailed sermon is not to be found here. These two themes are the first one, things and things in themselves. The other one, the translation of the German word Gemt as subject and not as mind or spirit.Previous Definitions two languages will be used one of them its Kants exposition of his sistem, the transcendental idealism (TI) and the other one, designated as the common sense language (CSL), the colloquial language concerning Husserls natural actitude. (1) In this later one, the things are the so called real things or physical objects, things we can see, touch and handle and modify them according to unequivocal purposes In this paper I shall refer only to this kind of things, simply calling them things. It is no necessary, I think to mention each sentence that Aristoteles defines these things as being in the mode of fusis and techne. (2) Heidegger also defines them as the natural things (3) When we are looking at something a state of things in this same action a representation appears in conscience of that we are looking at. We erroneously believe that we truly see things directly, but instead what we rightfully do is to become conscious of the representation of the thing.